


# Homoglyph/homograph domain names

Challenges and approaches

Brian King, MarkMonitor

Brian Lonergan, Donuts



# Problem Summary

## Problem Summary

brand.com

bra n d.com

b r a n d .com

*brand.com*

brand.com

brand.com

bran d .com

br a nd.com

bran d .com

## Problem Summary

brand.com

bra n d.com

b r a n d .com

**brānd.com**

**brand.com**

**brand.com**

bran d .com

br a nd.com

bran d .com

## Problem Summary

- google.domains
- google.domains
- gøogle.domains
- goog|e.domains
- google.domains
- gøøgle.domains

# Problem Summary

- xn--oogle-qmc.domains  
google.domains
- xn--gogle-m29a.domains  
google.domains
- xn--ggle-qk8o.domains  
gøogle.domains
- xn--googe-8tb.domains  
goog|e.domains
- xn--ogle-z7b4902b.domains  
google.domains
- xn--gle-8tb4222s.domains  
gøogle.domains

# Complicating factors

Browsers may/not show punycode

-<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+master/docs/idn.md>

Email clients may/not show punycode

Fonts may help, or not

# Efforts to Address the Problem



# Baseline

ICANN Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names, version 3 (2011)

Unicode was the agreed standard for domain name characters

One script per domain, no comingling scripts

Whole-script confusables remain available for exploitation

## Policy decisions in play today

Prohibit mixed script domains

-Baseline, required by ICANN

Require **language** instead of **script** indication

Block outright

-Bad policy, restricts legitimate use

Block variants/confusables after ASCII registration

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## Other options

-Remove select problematic confusables (<https://www.soluble.ai/blog/public-disclosure-emoji-to-zero-day>)

-L33t-sp3ak approach (UNR EPS block)

# Scope of Problem

# Scope

Homoglyphs are low **percentage** of phishing attacks

Interisle reports:

-219/298,000 phishing reports were IDNs, 0.2% of domains used

-50 classified as true homographic attacks; including:

-santander.com

-verizonwireless.com

<http://www.interisle.net/PhishingLandscape2020.pdf>

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- Overall effectiveness remains unknown
  - Data needed on effectiveness of homoglyph attacks
  - If good policy can stop just one, it's worth it

# Thank you

Thank you to Donuts, UNR, and Verisign for providing background, research, and insights.



# Questions?





**Thank you!**

